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Abstract. 
 
In some research evaluation systems, credit awarded to an article depends on the number of co-
authors on the article, with total credit to the article increasing with the number of co-authors.  
There are many examples of such evaluation systems (e.g., the United States National Research 
Council evaluation of graduate programs gave full credit to each co-author).  Such credit systems 
run the risk of encouraging ghost or honorary authorships.  In a recent article, António Osório 
and Lutz Bornmann (2019) propose a scheme to discourage ghost authorships but increase the 
total credit to a paper when co-authorships increase.  This article shows that if articles are valued 
more highly as the number of co-authorships increases, then there are opportunities to increase 
credit by mutually agreeing to add each other as authors.  Unrelated authors of unrelated papers 
may all benefit by expanding their co-author list.  I call this phenomena arbitrage—a term 
borrowed from economics and finance—since the content of the articles do not change, but the 
value increases by moving to a “market” of more co-authors where articles are valued 
differently. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The issue of how to count or credit publications with several authors is an important question 
that is addressed in the bibliometric and research evaluation literature.  In a recent Journal of 
Informetrics article, António Osório and Lutz Bornmann (2019), point out that assigning the 
same credit to an article regardless of the number of co-authors “ignores the potential synergies 
that result from collaborations” (p. 541).  They recognize the possibility that papers with more 
co-authors have more value and include a theoretical study. 
 
Osório and Bornmann are aware of the potential for encouraging ghost or honorary authorships.  
They addressed the issue of creating “distortions in comparing individuals with different co-
authorship patterns” and “incentives to the addition of ‘ghost’ co-authors, which is not 
desirable.”  They stated that “this issue is the objective of this paper” (p. 541).  Their credit 
system does give a disincentive to adding ghost authors to a single publication.  However, it is 
shown in this article, there are always incentives in any credit system for thoughtful authors to 
act in concert when the total credit or value of a publication increases with the number of 
authors.  This correspondence gives a theoretical property of credit systems but is not a practical 
guide to increase credit through ghost authorships. 
 
2.  Background and notation 
 
The notions in Osório and Bornmann (2019) are individual effort, credit, value of a 
collaboration, and the value when successful (published or accepted).   Egghe, Rousseau, and 
Van Hooydonk (2000) and more recently Osório (2018) also address various credit systems.  I 
use the notation from Osório (2018), since Osório and Bornmann (2019) assume equal credit to 
all authors on an article. 
 
A credit and value system may be a counting system such as those discussed by Egghe, 
Rousseau, and Van Hooydonk (2000) or may instead be a predetermined function of the citation 
count accumulating after publication.  In the second case, credit is a random variable.  Credit to 
the paper as a whole will be examined as dependent on n, the number of co-authors, to give 
credit 𝑐", but that is not to say that other factors may not affect the value.  A particular co-
author’s position i is assumed to determine his or her share of the credit, 𝑐#", of the total credit.  
The individual credit 𝑐#" may be independent of i as Osório and Bornmann assume, but I do not 
make that assumption.   
 
Assume the principle that the credit awarded to a paper is the sum of individual credits to 
each author on the paper, or 
 
A.1  𝑐" 	= 𝑐&" +	𝑐(" 	+ ⋯	+	𝑐"". 
 
Also assume that credit is non-negative, 𝑐#" ≥ 0. 
 
A ghost author is a co-author, whose contribution does not warrant an authorship 
recognition.  If a ghost author is added to an article, then the article’s total value goes from 𝑐" to 𝑐",&.  The decision to add ghost authors must be made prior to publication and the accumulation 
of citations.  This means the decision to be measured in the market of n authors 𝑐" or n+1 
authors 𝑐",& is made prior to publication.  In the scenario that credit is awarded after publication 
as a random variable by citation counts, I assume the credit or value 𝑐"is taken to be the 
expected value of the random variable based on the citation count.  In the Osório and Bornmann 
notation, 𝑐" = ?̅?".  Hence, 𝑐" and 𝑐#" are numerical for the remainder of this article. 
 
There is evidence that citation counts of publications increase with the number of co-
authors or  
 
A.2  𝑐" 	< 	 𝑐",&. 
 
Onodera and Yoshikane (2015) give a summary of studies considering various citation-
influencing factors (Table 1, p. 743).  They concluded that five studies found the number of 
coauthors a “strong or definite predictor”; four studies found the number of coauthors a “weak 
predictor or predictive power dependent on the model”; and four studies found the number of 
coauthors “not significant or negative predictor.”  Citing Onodera and Yoshikane and others, 
Osório and Bornmann accept that adding more authors should increase the expected value of a 
publication and so A.2 holds.  It may seem reasonable that visibility and the citation count 
improve if there are more co-authors (ghost or not) as there may be more close connections to 
the article’s authors.  They may have students or former students, past or present collaborators, 
colleagues, and more “team self-citations” (Garfield 1979:245). 
 
Note that A.2 may apply to research evaluation even if one does not wish to consider the 
citation evidence.  An important example comes from the United States National Academies.  
Their operating arm, the National Research Council, periodically evaluates graduate programs in 
the United States.  When counting publications per faculty, they counted 𝑐" = 𝑛 so that each co-
author receives credit for a full article (National Research Council. 2011).  This is called “total 
author counting” (Egghe et al. 2000, p. 146). 
 
3.  Arbitrage opportunities 
 
It is true that an evaluation system will have a disincentive to adding ghost authors to a 
single publication, if  𝑐#,1",& < 	 𝑐#" holds for 𝑗 ≥ 0.  The i-th author will lose credit if an additional 
author is added to the list.  However, this conclusion does not extend to more complicated 
arrangements where multiple authors are willing to add ghost authors to their publications in 
exchange for becoming ghost authors on other publications. 
 
Imagine the simplest situation.  Authors A and B are preparing article I and article II 
respectively.  If the authors separately publish the two articles as single authors, then each author 
will receive 𝑐&credit.  If they combine, then they may add the other author as a second author.  
Article I will have authors A & B and article II will have authors B & A.  Yes, author A may get 
less credit from article I, only 𝑐&(.  However, author A will get more total credit from the two 
articles, 𝑐&( + 𝑐(( = 𝑐(credit,  since 𝑐( > 𝑐&.  There may be a no-arbitrage principle in financial 
markets, but there are arbitrage opportunities in academic markets under A.2.  If a publication 
has greater value in the market with more coauthors, then move to that market. 
 
There are always academic arbitrage opportunities for authors or research groups to profit 
without additional effort by ghost author exchanges.  The example of two single authors is an 
example of two research groups each consisting of a single person.  It may be generalized to an 
arbitrary number and sizes of groups by a theoretical argument.  I do not try to control the credit 
within each group, as the group may wish to control that assignation. 
 
Proposition:  Consider a non-negative credit system where A.1 holds.  If papers with 
more co-authors are worth more total credit than papers with fewer co-authors (i.e., A.2 holds), 
then for any collection of research groups of any size whose membership is distinct, there are 
opportunities to increase the publication credit for all research groups by an exchange of ghost 
authors. 
 
The proof is given in the appendix. 
 
Some have considered ghost authorships outright fraud as discussed by Blaise Cronin 
(2005).  Nevertheless, nearly any contribution to an article may constitute justification as a co-
author and generosity in authorship recognition has not been considered immoral.  It may be hard 
to distinguish ghost authorship from minimal contributions.  Furthermore, if there is a desire 
among research evaluators to discourage authorship exchanges, then it is not clear who the 
gatekeeper of co-authorship restraint is to be: 
• Ghost authorship exchanges benefit researchers by increasing their individual credit. 
• Ghost authorship exchanges benefit universities and research institutes by increasing the 
aggregate credit awarded to the institution.  The institution’s bibliometric evaluation 
improves. 
• If expected values of citation counts do increase with the number of co-authors, then 
journal editors also benefit from more co-authors per paper, e.g., to increase journal 
impact factors. 
If ghost authorship exchanges are to the benefit of researchers, administrators, and editors, then it 
may be difficult to find an effective gatekeeper.  It is a conundrum that seems to be fundamental 
to bibliometric counting for the purpose of convenient research evaluation. 
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Appendix 
 
To prove the Proposition, a ghost exchange strategy is introduced that increases the credit 
for each research group involved.  It is theoretical in that the strategy involves a large number of 
papers and generally not practical.  In many situations, there are easier ways for arbitrage gains 
that depend on the particular system of research evaluation. 
 
For an example consider the total author counting system.  Suppose there are m research 
groups 𝒜# for i=1	, ⋯, m and each can produce one paper for a total of m papers.  All the 
researchers and groups will gain if all the authors become authors on all papers rather than 
publishing the m papers each with only the correct group of legitimate authors.  The credit with 
legitimate authors is 1 for each author, but with the exchange of ghost authors, each author gets 
credit for m. 
 
For the general case, the proposition is proved in a technical lemma below.  The lemma 
gives the general method of construction that works for a credit scheme. 
 
Lemma:  Suppose there are m research groups 𝒜# for i=1	, ⋯, m; 𝒜# consists of ni 
researchers; and 𝒜# 	∩ 𝒜7 = ∅ for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  Suppose the authors in each group receive credit by a 
non-negative credit system that satisfies A.1 and A.2.  Then there are counting numbers ki for 
i=1	, ⋯, m with 𝑘 = 𝑘& + ⋯+ 𝑘<, and  
(1) If group 𝒜# publishes ki papers with the (legitimate) authors 𝒜#, then the group 𝒜#	receives a total of 𝑘#𝑐"= credit. 
(2) If the groups publish all k articles together in a ghost authorship exchange, then there 
are author orderings so each group 𝒜#	receives a total of 𝑘#𝑐"credit. 
Since 𝑘#𝑐" > 𝑘#𝑐"=, the credit is greater for each group by engaging the ghost authorship 
exchange. 
 
Proof:  Write n = n1 + n2 + ··· + nm, so that n is the total number of researchers as the 
groups have distinct researchers.  Pick ki and k to be the multinomial coefficients): 
𝑘# = > 𝑛 − 1𝑛&, 𝑛(, ⋯ , 𝑛#	 − 1,⋯ , 𝑛<A 
and  𝑘 = > 𝑛𝑛&, 𝑛(, ⋯ , 𝑛<A 
 
(Ghahramani, 2005).  Note that 𝑘 = 𝑘& + ⋯+ 𝑘<	by the multinomial version of Pascal’s 
recursion formula (Abramowitz & Stegun, 1972, p. 823). 
 
Each group 𝒜# has ki papers for i=1	, ⋯, m.  The credit to a single paper published by the 
group of ni authors is 𝑐"=.  Since the group 𝒜# has ki papers, it will receive 𝑘#𝑐"= total credit.  
Hence part (1) follows. 
 
To address part (2), the notion of a permutation is required. A permutation is an ordered 
arrangement of objects (Ghahramani 2005).  For example, the permutations of A, B, and C are 
six: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA.  If two objects of the three are indistinguishable 
(or considered alike and for some purpose indistinguishable), then the distinguishable 
permutations are smaller in number.  For example, the distinguishable permutations of A, A, and 
C are three: AAC, ACA, and CAA.  Here the B is considered indistinguishable or like A and is 
denoted as a second A.  It is a general counting principle that the number of distinguishable 
permutations of n objects of m different types, where n1 are alike, n2 are alike, . . . , nm are alike 
and n = n1 + n2 + ··· + nm, is 𝑘 = B ""C,"D,⋯ ,"EF, the multinomial coefficient (Ghahramani 2005).   
 
Treat the ni members of the research group 𝒜# as indistinguishable or alike.  There are a 
total of n objects (authors) separated into m different types (research groups).  A permutation of 
the n objects is an ordering (like an author list on an article).  Each of the k articles will include 
all n authors following the various ordering specified by each of the k distinguishable 
permutations, which give the author orderings required in part (2).  Note that if a particular place 
on one of the articles is supposed to go to a member of 𝒜#, then the construction does not specify 
which particular member of 𝒜# it should be.  The decision is left to the group 𝒜# to decide.   
 
The next issue is to show the total credit awarded to the group 𝒜# from the collection of n 
articles is 𝑘#𝑐".  In how many permutations does a researcher from 𝒜# appear in the first 
position?  If the first position is filled by a member of 𝒜#, then other n-1 positions (that is 
positions 2 through n) may be filled by remaining researchers:  n1 from 𝒜&, n2 from 𝒜(, etc. but 
only ni-1 from 𝒜# because one member of 𝒜# is in the first position.  By the counting principle, 
a member of 𝒜# will appear in the first position ki times.  Looking only at the first position, the 
group 𝒜# receives 𝑘#𝑐&" credit.  There is nothing special about the first position and the argument 
applies to each of the n positions.  Hence the total credit awarded to the group 𝒜# is  
 𝑘#(𝑐&" + ⋯+ 𝑐"") 	= 𝑘#𝑐". 
 
This completes the proof.  QED 
 
The argument may be changed to run through all the permutations of authors rather than 
treating the members of a group as indistinguishable.  It would change k and ki to k =n! and ki = 
(𝑛 − 1)! 𝑛#.  This variation of argument would still improve the credit awarded to group 𝒜# from 𝑘#𝑐"= to 𝑘#𝑐".  However, each author in group 𝒜# would then get equal credit. 
 
 
References 
Abramowitz, M. Stegun, I.A. (1972). Handbook of Mathematical Functions with Formulas, 
Graphs, and Mathematical Tables (Partially Mathcad-enabled). U.S. Department of 
Commerce, NIST. Retrieved from  
https://app.knovel.com/hotlink/toc/id:kpHMFFGMT1/handbook-mathematical/handbook-
mathematical 
 
Bornmann, L. & Osório, A. (2019). The value and credits of n-authors publications. Journal of 
Informetrics 13, 540–554. 
 
Cronin, B. (2005) The hand of science:  Academic writing and its rewards. Lanham, Md: 
Scarecrow press.  
 
Egghe, L., Rousseau, R., & Van Hooydonk, G. (2000). Methods for accrediting publications to 
authors or countries: Consequences for evaluation studies.  Journal of the Association for 
Information Science and Technology 51(2), 145–157. 
 
National Research Council. (2011). A Data-based Assessment of Research Doctoral Programs in 
the United States. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
Onodera, N., Yoshikane, F. (2015). Factors affecting citation rates of research articles. Journal of 
the Association for Information Science and Technology 66 (4), 739-764. 
 
Osório, A. (2018). On the impossibility of a perfect counting method to allocate the credits of 
multi-authored publications.  Scientometrics.  116(3), 2161-2173. 
 
Garfield, E. (1979). Citation indexing, its theory and application in science, technology, and 
humanities. New York, NY: Wiley. 
 
Ghahramani, S. (2005).  Fundamentals of probability with stochastic processes (3rd ed.).  Upper 
Saddle River, NJ:  Pearson Prentice Hall. 
